William Mitchell Law Review
Volume 40 | Issue 2

Article 11

2014

Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States:
Current Issues and Future Directions
Stephen T. Middlebrook
Sarah Jane Hughes

Follow this and additional works at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr
Recommended Citation
Middlebrook, Stephen T. and Hughes, Sarah Jane (2014) "Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues and
Future Directions," William Mitchell Law Review: Vol. 40: Iss. 2, Article 11.
Available at: http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/11

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews
and Journals at Mitchell Hamline Open Access. It has been accepted for
inclusion in William Mitchell Law Review by an authorized administrator
of Mitchell Hamline Open Access. For more information, please contact
sean.felhofer@mitchellhamline.edu.
© Mitchell Hamline School of Law

Middlebrook and Hughes: Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues

REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCIES IN THE UNITED
STATES: CURRENT ISSUES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
Stephen T. Middlebrook† and Sarah Jane Hughes††
I. INTRODUCTION ...................................................................... 814
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES ...................... 815
A. Cryptocurrencies Gain Attention of Regulators and
Legislators ........................................................................ 815
B. Bitcoin.............................................................................. 817
C. Other Cryptocurrencies ....................................................... 819
D. Other Virtual Currencies .................................................... 820
III. PRECURSORS TO REGULATION—THE GOVERNMENT’S
PROSECUTION OF E-GOLD ...................................................... 822
A. e-gold, Ltd. Built a Successful Business Facilitating
Internet Payments ............................................................. 822
B. The United States Government Indictment Against e-gold
for Money Laundering and Other Offenses ......................... 823

†
Stephen T. Middlebrook is the General Counsel of FSV Payment Systems,
Inc., a prepaid processor and program manager. Prior to joining FSV, he was
Senior Counsel at the U.S. Department of the Treasury, Financial Management
Service. He is the current co-chair of the Electronic Payments and Financial
Services Subcommittee of the Cyberspace Law Committee and a contributor to
RFIDS, NEAR-FIELD COMMUNICATIONS, AND MOBILE PAYMENTS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS
(2013). He can be reached at stm@aol.com. The views contained in this article are
his and may not reflect the views of his employer.
†† Sarah Jane Hughes is the University Scholar and Fellow in Commercial
Law at the Maurer School of Law at Indiana University. She is a graduate of Mount
Holyoke College and of the University of Washington School of Law. She coauthored RESPONDING TO NATIONAL SECURITY LETTERS: A PRACTITIONER’S GUIDE
(2009) (with David P. Fidler), and contributed to and edited RFIDS, NEAR-FIELD
COMMUNICATIONS, AND MOBILE PAYMENTS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS (2013), with
Mr. Middlebrook and Candace M. Jones as co-editors. She has also written articles
on payments and banking law, policies and regulations related to the deterrence
of money laundering, and data security and privacy, including Red Skies in the
Morning—Professional Ethics and the Dawn of Cloud Computing, 38 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 111 (2011) (with Roland L. Trope).

813

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

1

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 11

814

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

IV. FINCEN SPEAKS—INITIAL GUIDANCE ON VIRTUAL
CURRENCIES ........................................................................... 828
V. ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS TAKE AN
INTEREST IN VIRTUAL CURRENCIES ....................................... 832
VI. THE GOVERNMENT ACTS—ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
AGAINST MT. GOX AND LIBERTY RESERVE ............................. 835
A. Homeland Security Seizes Funds Held by Bitcoin Exchange
Mt. Gox ............................................................................ 835
B. Department of Justice Indicts Liberty Reserve for Money
Laundering ...................................................................... 836
VII. FUTURE PARADIGMS FOR THE REGULATION OF
CRYPTOCURRENCY.................................................................. 838
VIII. CONCLUSION ......................................................................... 845

I.

INTRODUCTION

Since virtual currencies first came into the marketplace in the
1990s, those responsible for monetary policy, federal anti-moneylaundering and economic sanctions programs, along with federal
and state consumer protection regulators, payment systems
operators, businesses, and consumers have grappled with
understanding how these “currencies” work, whether they should
be deemed “lawful” payment methods in the United States, and, if
so, the manner and extent to which they should be regulated.
Regulatory activity related to offering virtual currencies has come
in fits and starts, with a burst of intensity in 2013 spurred by the
attention to and use of a special form of virtual currency known as
a cryptocurrency.
This article reviews developments in 2013 that pertain to
cryptocurrencies and their transactors and evaluates them against
the backdrop of long-established and more recent federal and state
licensure, payments systems, anti-money laundering, economic
sanctions, and consumer protection regulation. It also touches
upon transactors’ desires for anonymity and security in their
transactions and related information and discusses how the
technologies upon which cryptocurrencies are based may be
adapted to support both other payment methods and electronic
commerce in general.
Part II describes cryptocurrencies in the market in 2013. Part
III reviews the precursors to the current state of regulation in the
United States, particularly the federal government’s prosecution of
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e-gold, Ltd. In Part IV, we evaluate FinCEN’s initial guidance on
virtual currencies, which it published in March 2013, and discuss
industry reaction to the new rules. In Part V, we review recent
actions by legislators, other federal regulators and some state
actors. Part VI analyzes the federal government’s 2013 enforcement
actions against Mt. Gox Co. Ltd. (“Mt. Gox”), and Liberty Reserve,
which closely followed FinCEN’s March guidance. And, in Part VII,
we ask—and make some modest efforts to answer—the core
question: what does the future hold for cryptocurrency? The brief
conclusion in Part VIII relies in part on the legal history of
concepts of “money” and “legal tender” in the United States since
1862 and concludes that it is unrealistic to imagine that
cryptocurrencies will not face regulation in the United States for
some or all of the purposes mentioned in this article.
II. THE CURRENT STATE OF CRYPTOCURRENCIES
A.

Cryptocurrencies Gain Attention of Regulators and Legislators

In the spring of 2013 the U.S. Department of the Treasury’s
Financial Crimes Enforcement Network (FinCEN) issued guidance
on the compliance obligations of virtual currencies under the
1
federal Bank Secrecy Act (BSA). FinCEN’s announcement was
quickly followed by law enforcement action, including seizure of
assets of cryptocurrency participants held at banks in Maryland and
2
California. In addition, federal indictments, accompanied by
seizure orders, came down against the Costa Rica-based
3
cryptocurrency known as Liberty Reserve. Also, the State of
California’s Department of Financial Institutions issued a cease and
1. Bank Secrecy Act, tit. I–II, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114, 1114–24
(codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1951–1959; 31 U.S.C. §§ 5311–5314,
5316–5332 (2012)) (authorizing the Secretary of the Treasury to issue regulations
requiring financial institutions to keep and file reports that the Secretary
determines have a “high degree of usefulness in criminal, tax, or regulatory
investigations or proceedings, or in the conduct of intelligence or
counterintelligence matters, including analysis to protect against terrorism”
(quoting 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(a)(1)(A)); 31 C.F.R. §§ 1000–1099 (2013) (FinCEN’s
BSA regulations).
2. See Part VI.A for a discussion of the seizures conducted as part of the
enforcement action against Mt. Gox, an offshore bitcoin exchange.
3. See Part VI.B for a discussion of the seizures conducted as part of the
Liberty Reserve enforcement action.
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desist letter to the Bitcoin Foundation charging the foundation
with engaging in the business of money transmission without
obtaining a license or other authorization required by California’s
4
Money Transmission Act. The interests of federal and other state
legislators and regulators have been piqued, and investigations and
5
studies are underway on several fronts.
Cryptocurrencies have the potential to challenge government
supervision of monetary policy by the disruption of current
payment systems and the avoidance of existing regulatory schemes.
In particular, they offer, or at least are perceived as providing, the
ability to cloak transactions with a level of anonymity that is
currently found only with certain cash transactions. Consequently,
cryptocurrencies are of special interest to those who value their
privacy, whether that desire springs from personal or political
views, a desire to evade taxes, or for other nefarious purposes such
as money laundering, terrorism, child pornography, or human
6
trafficking.
Beyond these prospects, some charge that cryptocurrencies
lack proper consumer protections, including consumers’ rights to
prompt and full redemption of funds on terms specified in
contracts that consumers have with entities holding their virtual
7
currency. Additionally, cryptocurrencies are theoretically open to
4. Jon Matonis, Bitcoin Foundation Receives Cease and Desist Order from
California, FORBES (June 23, 2013, 11:11 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites
/jonmatonis/2013/06/23/bitcoin-foundation-receives-cease-and-desist-order-from
-california (describing and including a copy of the California Department of
Financial Institutions’ cease-and-desist letter to the Bitcoin Foundation, May 30,
2013, which references California Financial Code sections 2030 and 2151–2152,
California Business & Professional Code sections 17200 and 17205–17206, 18
U.S.C. § 1960, and 31 U.S.C. § 5330). For a discussion of the letter, see Rick
Fischer, Obrea O. Poindexter & Matthew Ly, Bitcoin Receives Cease and Desist Order
Evidencing Increased Regulatory Scrutiny of Virtual Currency, MORRISON FOERSTER (July
18, 2013), http://www.mofo.com/files/Uploads/Images/130718-Bitcoin-Receives
-Cease-and-Desist.pdf.
5. See Part V for a discussion of the state and federal initiatives related to
cryptocurrencies.
6. For more extensive discussion of these privacy issues, see Danton Lee
Bryans, Note, Bitcoin and Money Laundering: Mining for an Effective Solution, 89 IND.
L.J. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 38–39), available at http://ssrn.com
/abstract=2317990.
7. An example of such a consumer protection problem arose on June 20,
2013 when Mt. Gox, a bitcoin exchange, suspended redemption in U.S. dollars for
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use to transfer funds to persons who themselves are Specially
8
Designated Nationals or to nations that are covered by one of
many economic sanctions programs under the supervision of the
9
Treasury Department’s Office of Foreign Asset Controls. No
wonder that they are attracting much attention from the United
States government.
B.

Bitcoin

Much of the recent media attention surrounding virtual
currencies has been focused on bitcoins, due in large part to their
extreme volatility, with prices for a single bitcoin moving from $13
10
in January 2013 to $1242 on November 29, 2013, just a few dollars
11
short of the price of an ounce of gold. Frequently described as a
“cryptocurrency,” bitcoins have no physical presence and no
two weeks. Press Release, Mt. Gox, Statement Regarding Temporary Hiatus on
U.S. Dollar Withdrawals (June 20, 2013), https://mtgox.com/press_release
_20130620.html. For a wonderful, early discussion of issues arising in connection
with stored value and e-money in their infancy, see Task Force on Stored-Value
Cards, A Commercial Lawyer’s Take on the Electronic Purse: An Analysis of Commercial
Law Issues Associated with Stored-Value Cards and Electronic Money, 52 BUS. LAW. 653
(1997).
8. See Specially Designated Nationals List (SDN), U.S. DEP’T TREASURY,
http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx
(last visited Nov. 18, 2013). The preamble to the website’s coverage explains:
As part of its enforcement efforts, OFAC publishes a list of
individuals and companies owned or controlled by, or acting for or on
behalf of, targeted countries. It also lists individuals, groups, and
entities, such as terrorists and narcotics traffickers designated under
programs that are not country-specific. Collectively, such individuals
and companies are called “Specially Designated Nationals” or “SDNs.”
Their assets are blocked and U.S. persons are generally prohibited
from dealing with them.
Id.
9. For an explanation of the U.S. economic sanctions programs that the
Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control enforces, see Office of Foreign Assets
Control—Sanctions Programs and Information, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY, http://www
.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Nov. 17,
2013).
10. The Mysterious World of Bitcoin: Does It Have Staying Power?, WHARTON
SCH. U. PENN. (Apr. 24, 2013), http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the
-mysterious-world-of-bitcoin-does-it-have-staying-power.
11. Ben Rooney, Bitcoin Worth Almost as Much as Gold, CNNMONEY.COM
(Nov. 29, 2013), available at LEXIS.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2014

5

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 2 [2014], Art. 11

818

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40:2

central authority in charge of the money supply, but instead, they
rely upon a peer-to-peer network of participants to maintain a huge
12
database of valid bitcoins used to verify transactions. Each bitcoin
is in essence a chain of digital signatures which, when decoded,
13
provide the entire transactional history of the bitcoin. The
members of the network who verify new transactions, a process
involving intense mathematical computations, are called “miners”
14
and are rewarded for their service with additional bitcoins.
The number of bitcoins slowly expands over time, but will
reach a pre-announced limit of twenty-one million around the year
15
2040. The supply of bitcoin “money” is not controlled by any
government or central authority and cannot be manipulated for
political purposes—a definite advantage to the currency in the eyes
16
of some. Bitcoin is frequently described as anonymous, because
while every transaction is recorded in the public “block chain,”
17
parties are identified only by a bitcoin address. It is possible to
trace transactions although it may be difficult to associate a
18
transaction with a particular individual. To obtain bitcoins, you
either need to be a “miner” or you must purchase them on a
19
currency exchange. Users keep their bitcoins in a wallet, which is
20
stored either in the cloud or on their personal computer.
Bitcoins may be used to make purchases from a growing
21
number of merchants, although the currency is still strongly
12. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, VIRTUAL CURRENCY SCHEMES 21 (Oct. 2012),
available at http://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes
201210en.pdf.
13. Id. at 23.
14. Id. at 23–24.
15. Id. at 24−25 (explaining that the bitcoin protocol was designed to allow
for the money supply to increase at a predictable pace, without the possibility of
intervention by a central authority, in order to prevent inflation).
16. See id.
17. See Nicole Perlroth, Unlike Liberty Reserve, Bitcoin Is Not Anonymous—Yet,
N.Y. TIMES (May 29, 2013), 2013 WLNR 13121843.
18. Andy Greenberg, Follow the Bitcoins: How We Got Busted Buying Drugs on
Silk Road’s Black Market, FORBES (Sept. 5, 2013, 10:36 AM), http://www.forbes
.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/09/05/follow-the-bitcoins-how-we-got-busted
-buying-drugs-on-silk-roads-black-market; Perlroth, supra note 17.
19. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 12, at 21, 24.
20. Virtual Currency: Bits and Bob, ECONOMIST.COM (June 13, 2011, 8:30 PM),
available at Westlaw.
21. Bailey Reutzel, Why Some Merchants Accept Bitcoin Despite the Risks,
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suspected of being associated with underground and illegal
22
transactions. In particular, it was the payment mechanism of
choice on Silk Road, an online marketplace for drugs, erotica, fake
23
IDs, and other illegal goods before the government shut down the
24
website. Despite its current bad-boy reputation, traditional
bankers have taken notice of bitcoin and are working on
25
integrating it into more mainstream financial services. Companies
that provide bitcoin-related products and services—things like
currency exchanges, wallets, mining equipment, and software—are
also garnering attention from venture capitalists and other
26
investors.
C.

Other Cryptocurrencies

Bitcoin may be the media darling of the moment, but it is not
the only virtual currency in existence. Other cryptocurrencies such
as Litecoin, GeistGeld, SolidCoin, BBQcoin, and PPCoin are
similar in nature to Bitcoin but claim to offer technological
improvements that will make them faster, safer, or more con27
venient than Bitcoin. A modified version of the Bitcoin protocol
PAYMENTS SOURCE (May 21, 2013, 4:00 AM), available at LEXIS.
22. Arwa Mahdawi, Bitcoin: More Than Just the Currency of Digital Vice,
GUARDIAN (Mar. 4, 2013), 2013 WLNR 5318040.
23. James Ball, Silk Road: The Online Drug Marketplace That Officials Seem
Powerless to Stop, GUARDIAN (Mar. 22, 2013, 12:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk
/world/2013/mar/22/silk-road-online-drug-marketplace.
24. Andy Greenberg, End of the Silk Road: FBI Says It’s Busted the Web’s Biggest
Anonymous Drug Black Market, FORBES (Oct. 2, 2013, 12:35 PM), http://www
.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/02/end-of-the-silk-road-fbi-busts-the
-webs-biggest-anonymous-drug-black-market.
25. See Marc Hostein, Lightning Fast, Dirt Cheap: Bitcoin Shows What Banking
Could Be, AM. BANKER (Aug. 24, 2012, 1:58 PM), http://www.americanbanker
.com/bankthink/lightning-fast-dirt-cheap-bitcoin-shows-what-banking-could-be
-1052108-1.html; Jon Matonis, Bitcoin on the PayPal Network, FORBES (May 4, 2013,
10:16 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jonmatonis/2013/05/04/bitcoin-on-the
-paypal-network.
26. Stacey Cowly, The Winklevoss Twins Are Bitcoin Bulls, CNNMONEY.COM
(May 18, 2013, 11:35 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/05/18/investing
/winklevoss-bitcoin/index.html; Jon Matonis, New Bitcoin VC Fund Seeks Edge with
Regulatory, Security Skills, AM. BANKER (May 29, 2013, 2:24 PM), http://www
.americanbanker.com/bankthink/new-bitcoin-vc-fund-seeks-edge-with-regulatory
-security-skills-1059453-1.html.
27. See Andrew R. Johnson, Promise and Peril of Virtual Currencies, WALL ST. J.,
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with enhancements to support increased anonymity, dubbed
28
“Bitcoin 2,” also has been proposed. The rise of these so called
29
“altcoins” has been criticized by some as detrimental to
30
31
cryptocurrencies and doomed to failure. In addition, virtual
currencies like Liberty Reserve, WebMoney, Perfect Money, and
32
CashU are designed to be totally anonymous, although only time
will tell whether such claims are true. These services are typically
based outside of the United States, do little or nothing to verify the
identity of their customers, and do not accept payment directly but
require users to go through a third party to buy or sell their
33
currency.
D.

Other Virtual Currencies

In addition to the products discussed above, there are virtual
currencies in the market that do not rely on cryptography. The
online role-playing game Second Life created by Linden Labs has
been around since 2003 and allows players to participate in a
34
virtual economy based on Linden Dollars. Whereas Bitcoin lacks a
central monetary authority, Second Life maintains control over its
May 29, 2013, at C2, available at LEXIS; Tom Simonite, Bitcoin Isn’t the
Only Cryptocurrency in Town, MIT TECH. REV. (Apr. 15, 2013), http://www
.technologyreview.com/news/513661/bitcoin-isnt-the-only-cryptocurrency-in
-town.
28. Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Activists Propose Hard Fork to Bitcoin to Keep It
Anonymous and Regulation-Free, COINDESK (July 25, 2013, 7:08 PM), http://www
.coindesk.com/bitcoin-activists-suggest-hard-fork-to-bitcoin-to-keep-it-anonymous
-and-regulation-free.
29. A listing of altcoins can be found at List of Alternative Cryptocurrencies,
BITCOIN WIKI, https://en.bitcoin.it/wiki/List_of_alterantive_cryptocurrencies (last
visited Oct. 15, 2013). Some commentators recognize Ripple as an “altcoin” and
others do not. The cited list does not recognize Ripple as an altcoin, conceiving of
Ripple more like a different payment system with similar concepts operating in a
closed-source, centralized nature. See id.
30. David Gilson, MasterCoin to Create New Altcoins in Bitcoin’s Block Chain,
COINDESK (Aug. 25, 2013, 10:45 AM), http://www.coindesk.com/mastercoin-to
-create-new-altcoins-in-bitcoins-block-chain.
31. Daniel Krawisz, The Problem with Altcoins, MISES CIRCLE (Aug. 22, 2013),
http://themisescircle.org/blog/2013/08/22/the-problem-with-altcoins.
32. Nicole Perlroth, Anonymous Payment Schemes Thriving on Web, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2013, at B1, available at 2013 WLNR 13235067.
33. Id.
34. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, supra note 12, at 28–29.
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35

currency through a variety of mechanisms. Players who earn a
profit selling virtual land and goods to other players can even
36
convert their Linden Dollars back into real money.
In 2010, Facebook announced its virtual currency called
Facebook Credits, which would facilitate payments in games and
37
apps operating on the site. Within two years, however, it
38
abandoned the virtual currency and is facing a class action lawsuit
brought by parents of children who purchased Facebook Credits
39
without parental consent.
Although Facebook may be retreating, Amazon is marching
forward, announcing Amazon Coins, a virtual currency for use on
40
the company’s Kindle Fire tablets. Commentators are already
41
criticizing Amazon Coins as being of limited value to consumers,
but that has not stopped Amazon from filing for a patent on its
42
digital currency.
In an interesting twist, the founder of the failed virtual
43
currency e-gold is involved in efforts to launch a new virtual
44
currency backed by reserves of gold.
35. Id. at 29.
36. Id.; Michael S. Rosenwald, In the Virtual World, Making Actual Millions;
Online Entrepreneurs Meet Avatars’ Needs as Well as Their Own, WASH. POST, Mar. 8,
2010, at A01, available at 2010 WLNR 26708271.
37. Dean Takahashi, How Facebook Plans to Fuel the App Economy with Facebook
Credits, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 21, 2010, 3:18 PM), http://venturebeat.com/2010/04
/21/how-facebook-plans-to-fuel-the-app-economy-with-facebook-credits.
38. Tim Peterson, Facebook Gives Up on Facebook Credits, ADWEEK
(June 20, 2012, 10:26 AM), http://www.adweek.com/news/technology/facebook
-gives-facebook-credits-141237.
39. Tom Cheredar, Can Minors Buy Facebook Credits? Parents Demand Refund in
Class Action Suit, VENTUREBEAT (Apr. 20, 2012, 10:27 AM), http://venturebeat.com
/2012/04/20/facebook-credits-minors.
40. Bailey Reutzel, Amazon Advances in Virtual Money Battle While Facebook
Retreats, AM. BANKER (Feb. 11, 2013), 2013 WLNR 3209781.
41. Lee Hutchinson, Amazon’s New “Virtual Currency” of Dubious Benefit
to Customers, ARS TECHNICA (May 13, 2013, 10:08 AM), http://arstechnica.com
/business/2013/05/amazons-new-virtual-currency-of-dubious-benefit-to
-customers.
42. Amazon Applies for Patent on Digital Currency, PAYMENTS J. (Apr. 29, 2013),
http://paymentsjournal.com/Content/Featured_Stories/16200.
43. e-gold is discussed in depth in Part III, infra.
44. Stephen Foley, E-gold Founder Backs New Bitcoin Rival, FIN. TIMES
(London) (Nov. 28, 2013, 2:44 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/f7488616-561a
-11e3-96f5-00144feabdc0.html; see also Stephen Foley, Bitcoin Needs to Learn from
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III. PRECURSORS TO REGULATION—THE GOVERNMENT’S
PROSECUTION OF E-GOLD
While recent interest in cryptocurrencies has been sparked by
Bitcoin and related products, law enforcement first took notice of
virtual currencies back in 2007 when the federal government
charged e-gold, Ltd. and its owners with violating federal and state
laws regarding “money transmission” services. This section of this
article describes the e-gold, Ltd. business model, the criminal
prosecution of the company, and the current status of the company
and its assets. In addition, the section critiques the application of
“money transmission” laws to e-gold and discusses what the court’s
decision may mean for cryptocurrencies.
A.

e-gold, Ltd. Built a Successful Business Facilitating Internet
45
Payments

Before it was effectively shut down by law enforcement, e-gold,
Ltd. was an Internet-based system that allowed individuals to make
domestic and international payments denominated not in dollars
46
or pounds or euros, but rather in gold and other precious metals.
e-gold promoted its product as unique because “every ounce is
secured by actual gold bullion held in allocated storage at
47
repositories certified by the London Bullion Market Association.”
Title to the bullion was held by the e-gold Bullion Reserve Special
Purpose Trust for the exclusive benefit of holders of e-gold, e-silver,
48
e-platinum, and e-palladium. In 1999, the Financial Times
described e-gold as “the only electronic currency that has achieved
Past E-Currency Failures, FIN. TIMES (London) (Nov. 28, 2013, 8:45 AM),
http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/6d51117e-5806-11e3-a2ed-00144feabdc0.html.
45. Part III.A is derived in part from an article previously published by the
authors. See Sarah Jane Hughes, Stephen T. Middlebrook & Broox W. Peterson,
Developments in the Law Concerning Stored-Value Cards and Other Electronic Payments
Products, 63 BUS. LAW. 237, 255–57 (2007).
46. See generally, Kim Zetter, Bullion and Bandits: The Improbable Rise and Fall of
E-Gold, WIRED (June 9, 2009, 12:00 AM), http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2009
/06/e-gold/.
47. Defendants’ Status Report and Notice of Compliance with This Court’s
Seizure Warrants and Post-Indictment Restraining Order at 6, United States v.
e-gold, Ltd., No. 07-109-RMC (D.D.C. May 17, 2007), ECF No. 28, available at
http://cryptome.org/e-gold/028.pdf.
48. Id.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/11

10

Middlebrook and Hughes: Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues

2014]

REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCIES

823

critical mass on the web. . . . For merchants, [e-gold] has a further
bonus: unlike credit cards, which are liable to charge backs, the
49
system guarantees payment once ordered.” Early write-ups in
50
51
magazines such as Barron’s and Wired gave e-gold both visibility
and credibility.
B.

The United States Government Indictment against e-gold for Money
52
Laundering and Other Offenses

On April 24, 2007, a federal grand jury in the District of
Columbia handed down a four-count indictment against e-gold,
Ltd; its affiliate Gold & Silver Reserve, Inc.; and their owners,
53
Dr. Douglas L. Jackson, Reid Jackson, and Barry K. Downey.
The government alleged that “[e-gold] has been a highly favored
method of payment by operators of investment scams, credit card
and identity fraud, and sellers of online child pornography,” and
that e-gold facilitated its customers’ payments “knowing that the
54
funds involved were the proceeds of unlawful activity.”
Count one of the indictment charged the defendants with
transmitting monetary instruments or funds involving the proceeds
of illegal activity with the intent of promoting that illegal activity,
49. Tim Jackson, When Gold Makes Cents, FIN. TIMES (London), July 13, 1999,
at 18.
50. Jack White & Doug Ramsey, Making New Money, BARRON’S, Apr. 23, 2001,
at 59, available at LEXIS (“With the global explosion of the Internet and
e-commerce, the world needs a new type of currency. It needs an asset-backed,
high-tech monetary standard, without the political machinations that hobble the
euro, the dollar, the yen and all other traditional currencies. . . . One company,
[e]-gold, already allows online users to settle payments using its currency, which is
100% backed by gold.”).
51. Julian Dibbell, In Gold We Trust, WIRED (Jan. 2002), http://
www.wired.com/wired/archive/10.01/egold.html (“Invulnerable to government
manipulation and subject to the kinds of market forces only a worldwide, 24/7,
open-ended network can bring to bear, e-gold promises not simply better money
but the best: a money supply kept so straight and narrow that it has room for
neither bubbles nor crashes.”).
52. The first four paragraphs of Part III.B are derived from an article
previously published by the authors. See Hughes et al., supra note 45, at 257–59.
53. Indictment at 1, United States v. e-gold, Ltd., No. 07-109 (D.D.C. Apr. 24,
2007), 2007 WL 2988241 [hereinafter “e-gold Indictment”].
54. Press Release, Dep’t of Justice, Digital Currency Business E-Gold Indicted
for Money Laundering and Illegal Money Transmitting (Apr. 27, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/April/07_crm_301.html.
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knowing that the transactions were designed to conceal the source
55
of the proceeds of the illegal activity. At issue were transfers of
e-gold from one account to another that the government alleged
facilitated the sale of child pornography, stolen credit and debit
card information, and various types of investment fraud, such as
56
Ponzi schemes and illegal high-yield investment programs. The
indictment identified thirty-six specific e-gold transactions taking
place between August 2000 and December 2005 with dollar values
ranging from $40 to $725,000 that the government asserted were
57
made in support of such illegal activity.
The remaining three counts of the indictment alleged that
e-gold operated as a money transmitter without an appropriate
state license, failed to comply with federal money transmitter
regulations, and transmitted funds known to have been derived
58
from a criminal offense. According to the government, e-gold
failed to obtain a money transmitter’s license in the District of
59
60
Columbia, as is required by law. Prosecutors further alleged that
e-gold ignored federal requirements to implement an anti-money61
laundering program and to file Suspicious Activity Reports with
62
the Treasury. The indictment alleged that e-gold failed to verify
63
the identity of its customers, allowed accounts with obviously
64
bogus names such as “Mickey Mouse” and “Anonymous Man,”
hired employees with no experience in financial services and
65
provided them with little or no training, allowed transactions with
suspicious notations such as “child porn” and “CC fraud,” and did
66
little or nothing to stop transactions tied to illegal behavior. As

55. e-gold Indictment, supra note 53, ¶ 29 (alleging violations of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 1956(a)(1)(A)(i), 1956(a)(1)(B)(i), 1956(a)(2)(B)(i), and 1957).
56. Id. ¶¶ 23–26.
57. Id. ¶¶ 42–47.
58. Id. ¶ 50.
59. Id. ¶ 68.
60. See id. at 26 (citing D.C. CODE § 26-1001(10)).
61. Id. ¶ 11 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(h) and its implementing regulations, 31
C.F.R. § 103.125).
62. Id. ¶ 12 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) in conjunction with 31 C.F.R.
§ 103.20 (current version at 31 C.F.R. § 1022.320 (2013))).
63. Id. ¶ 31.
64. Id. ¶¶ 20–21.
65. Id. ¶ 32.
66. Id. ¶¶ 34–35.
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well as being independent violations of the law, these offenses
67
constituted criminal offenses under 18 U.S.C. § 1960.
In August 2007, the federal court ordered the seizure of all of
the assets of e-gold, including bank accounts, precious metals, and
68
accounts receivable both in the United States and abroad.
Subsequently, e-gold entered into a plea agreement resolving the
69
charges against it. Its remaining assets are being distributed to
70
users under a court-approved plan.
Prior to entering into the plea agreement, defendants
unsuccessfully sought to have most of the indictment dismissed,
asserting the government had failed to allege adequate facts to
71
support the charges. Defendants’ primary argument was the
statute they were charged under, 18 U.S.C. § 1960, applied only to
a “money transmitting business” and that in order to be a money
72
transmitting business an entity must engage in cash transactions.
They argued that because they do not deal in cash, the indictment
73
must be dismissed. The court rejected e-gold’s argument,
concluding, “Section 1960 defines what it means to be unlicensed
and what it means to engage in money transmitting. By those
definitions, a business can clearly engage in money transmitting
without limiting its transactions to cash or currency and would
74
commit a crime if it did so without being licensed.” The court
read § 1960 as providing an expansive definition of money
transmission: “Section 1960 defines ‘money transmitting’ broadly to

67. See 18 U.S.C. § 1960(a) (2006) (“Whoever knowingly conducts, controls,
manages, supervises, directs, or owns all or part of an unlicensed money
transmitting business, shall be fined in accordance with this title or imprisoned
not more than 5 years, or both.”).
68. Post-Indictment Restraining Order at 3–4, United States v. e-gold, Ltd.,
No. 07-109 (D.D.C. Apr. 25, 2007), ECF No. 33, available at http://ia600202
.us.archive.org/16/items/gov.uscourts.dcd.125293/gov.uscourts.dcd.125293.33.0
.pdf.
69. Plea Agreement of e-gold, Ltd., United States v. e-gold, Ltd., No. 07-10901 (D.D.C. July 21, 2008), 2008 WL 4234436.
70. See Douglas Jackson, e-gold Value Access Plan Overview, E-GOLD BLOG
(Aug. 12, 2011, 7:45 PM), http://blog.e-gold.com/2011/08/vap-overview.html.
71. e-gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 84.
72. Id.
73. Id.
74. Id.
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including transferring ‘funds,’ not just currency, by ‘any and all
75
means;’ it is not limited to cash transactions.”
Defendants argued that within federal law, the term “money
transmitting business” is only defined at 31 U.S.C. § 5330, which
provides that a business can be considered a “money transmitting
business” only if it is required to file cash transaction reports under
76
31 U.S.C. § 5313. Section 5313, in turn, places a reporting
requirement only upon domestic financial institutions involved in
transactions of “United States coins or currency (or other monetary
77
instruments the Secretary of the Treasury prescribes).”
Accordingly, e-gold argued that because § 5330 applies only if
§ 5313 is triggered, and § 5313 requires the handling of cash or
78
coin, § 5330 also must require the handling of cash or coin.
The court was not persuaded, concluding that in fashioning
§ 1960, Congress did not borrow from § 5330, but rather relied
upon 18 U.S.C. § 1955, which makes it a federal crime to operate a
79
gambling business in violation of state law. Looking at the
80
legislative history of § 1955, the court found that Congress used
the term “gambling business” to indicate that it sought to
criminalize only large-scale illegal gambling operations: “Because
Section 1960 was modeled from Section 1955, it can be inferred
that Congress employed the term ‘business’ after ‘money
transmitting’ in subsections (a) and (b)(1) of Section 1960 to
indicate that Section 1960 was designed to tackle large-scale
operations as opposed to small-scale or individual money
81
transmitters.”
75. Id. at 88 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1960(b)(2) (2006)).
76. Id. at 87–88.
77. 31 U.S.C. § 5313(a) (2006).
78. e-gold, Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 2d at 87–88.
79. Id. at 89.
80. Anticipating that its reliance on the legislative history of § 1955—a
statute not at issue in the case—might trouble some readers, the court
preemptively defended its analysis:
The Court recognizes that reliance on the legislative history of a
separate, albeit historically related, statute may not by itself eliminate
all ambiguity from the phrase “money transmitting business” in Section
1960 (assuming arguendo that any ambiguity existed at the outset). The
structure of the statute as well as the relevant canons of statutory
construction, however, guide the Court to the same conclusion.
Id. at 90.
81. Id.
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The day before oral argument was held on defendants’ motion
82
to dismiss, the government filed a superseding indictment that
buttressed the large-scale nature of e-gold’s “money transmitting
business” by alleging it maintained “a cadre of employees” and
83
transferred “approximately $145,535,374.26” in funds. With these
facts included in the indictment, the court concluded that e-gold
constituted a “money transmitter” and a “business” and, thus, was
84
also a “money transmitter business.” The court also held that even
though e-gold had never handled currency or coin, it was still
subject to the currency reporting requirements: “A money
transmitting business is no less a transmitter of money just because
it does not deal in currency. Rather, Section 5313 comes into force
and will require a report if, when, and as the transmitter does
85
engage in currency transactions.” In conclusion, the court was
very clear in its view that handling cash is not the touchstone of
being a money transmitting business under federal law. “The term
‘money transmitting business’ as used in Section 5330 includes all
financial institutions that fall outside of the conventional financial
system (and that are not a ‘depository institution’), not just those
86
that engage in cash transactions.”
The court’s decision, however, raises as many questions as it
answers. If all entities could theoretically handle cash at some time
in the future and thus be subject to § 5313, how could being
subject to § 5313 possibly serve as a limiting factor in the
application of § 1960(a)? What limitations, if any, are there on the
application of money transmitter business laws? What does the
expansion of money transmission from cash and currency to the
more general term “funds” mean for virtual currencies? If e-gold—
an Internet-based system that allowed users to transfer among
themselves electronic warehouse receipts for precious metals—was
required to comply with federal money transmitter laws, then do
other similar Internet systems also need to come into compliance?
And if transactions in virtual currencies do constitute money
transmission, does the court’s reliance on the legislative history of
§ 1955 and its focus on large-scale versus small-scale enterprises
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 85 n.1.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 93.
Id. at 95.
Id. at 93.
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mean that only major participants would fall under the regulations
while small players and mere users would be free from government
oversight?
IV. FINCEN SPEAKS—INITIAL GUIDANCE ON VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
On March 18, 2013, FinCEN issued interpretive guidance
clarifying the application of the BSA to virtual currencies
87
(“FinCEN Guidance”). The guidance interprets FinCEN’s recently
amended regulations governing money services businesses (MSBs),
which includes currency exchanges and money transmitters
88
(“MSB Rule”), and regulations governing providers and sellers of
89
prepaid access (“Prepaid Access Rule”). The guidance attempts to
clarify if and when a participant in a virtual currency scheme might
be engaged in “money transmission,” which would require the
entity to comply with the MSB Rule requirements to register, file
reports, and maintain records.
FinCEN began its analysis by distinguishing “real” currency
from “virtual” currency. Real currency is the coin and paper money
of the United States or another country that has status of legal
90
tender in the country of issue. Virtual currency does not have
legal tender status and thus is not currency. Some virtual currency,
however, has an equivalent value in real currency or may be used as
a “substitute” for real currency, and FinCEN deems this
91
“convertible virtual currency.” FinCEN is not explicit on this
point, but presumably a virtual currency, such as Bitcoin, that can
be exchanged for real currency would constitute a convertible
virtual currency. FinCEN concludes that the Prepaid Access Rule
only applies to real currency and thus is not applicable to virtual
87. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, FIN-2013G001, APPLICATION OF FINCEN’S REGULATIONS TO PERSONS ADMINISTERING,
EXCHANGING, OR USING VIRTUAL CURRENCIES (2013), available at http://www.fincen
.gov/statutes_regs/guidance/pdf/FIN-2013-G001.pdf.
88. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations; Definitions and Other Regulations
Relating to Money Services Businesses, 76 Fed. Reg. 43,585 (July 21, 2011)
(codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010, 1021–1022).
89. Bank Secrecy Act Regulations—Definitions and Other Regulations
Relating to Prepaid Access, 76 Fed. Reg. 45,403 (July 29, 2011) (codified at 31
C.F.R. pt. 1010, 1022).
90. FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 87, at 1 (citing 31 C.F.R.
§ 1010.100(m) (2012)).
91. Id.
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92

currencies. Likewise, the regulations governing foreign exchange
only cover currencies issued by other countries and thus do not
93
apply to virtual currencies.
Because a convertible virtual currency may “substitute” for real
currency, it may qualify as a form of money transmission. FinCEN
defines money transmission as “the acceptance of currency, funds,
or other value that substitutes for currency from one person and
the transmission of currency, funds, or other value that substitutes
94
for currency to another location or person by any means.”
Whether a particular entity is or is not a money transmitter is
“a matter of facts and circumstances,” and the rules include a
95
number of exemptions from the general rule. Under this
guidance, a person who accepts a convertible virtual currency from
one person and then transmits that convertible virtual currency to
another person or location would be a money transmitter for
96
FinCEN’s purposes.
In the next step of its analysis, FinCEN divides the participants
in virtual currency arrangements into three categories: users,
97
exchangers, and administrators. Users obtain virtual currency in
98
order to purchase real or virtual goods and services. An exchanger
is a person engaged as a business in the exchange of virtual
99
currency for real or virtual currency. An administrator is a person
100
engaged as a business in issuing and redeeming virtual currency.
FinCEN quickly concludes users are not MSBs because they do not
101
transmit the value of funds to another person or location. “An
administrator or exchanger that (1) accepts and transmits a
convertible virtual currency or (2) buys or sells convertible virtual
currency,” however, is a money transmitter unless an exemption
102
applies. One exemption carves out an entity that accepts and
transmits funds solely for the purpose of affecting a bona fide
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id. at 5.
Id. at 5–6.
31 C.F.R. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i)(A) (2012).
Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(ii).
Id. § 1010.100(ff)(5)(i).
FIN. CRIMES ENFORCEMENT NETWORK, supra note 87, at 2.
Id.
Id. at 3.
Id.
See id.
Id.
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purchase or sale of currency—real or virtual—from the entity
103
accepting the funds. In that case, the person is not acting as a
104
money transmitter.
In an arrangement with a centralized administrator, the
administrator will be a money transmitter to the “extent that it
allows transfers of value between persons or from one location to
105
another.” In addition, an intermediary exchange that accepts
funds from a user and then transmits those funds to the user’s
account with the administrator would also be engaged in money
106
transmission.
FinCEN acknowledges that the third-party
exchange might appear to be conducting a bona fide purchase and
thus entitled to an exemption, but notes that the safe harbor
does not apply when the only service being provided is money
107
transmission.
In a decentralized arrangement, a person who creates units of
the virtual currency (a “miner” in Bitcoin parlance) and uses it to
108
purchase real or virtual goods would not be a money transmitter.
FinCEN notes, however, “a person that creates units of convertible
virtual currency and sells those units to another person for real
currency or its equivalent is engaged in transmission to another
109
location and is a money transmitter.”
Although the FinCEN Guidance is not a model of clarity, it
appears that individuals who merely use a virtual currency to
purchase goods or services are not deemed money transmitters and
110
are not required to register as an MSB. Users who attempt to sell
111
their virtual currency, however, may become money transmitters.
An administrator or an exchange that transmits convertible
virtual currency to another person or location would be required to
112
register as an MSB. FinCEN’s description of both an exchanger
and an administrator contain the phrase “engaged as a business,”

103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 4.
Id.
See id.
Id. at 5.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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113

which is not defined. The inclusion of this limiting descriptor
seems to echo the large-scale-versus-small-scale dichotomy that the
court in United States v. e-gold incorporated in its analysis of money
114
transmission. It is unclear at what point an entity participating in
the virtual currency scheme would be deemed to be acting as a
business, and thus, it is difficult to advise such an entity as to when
its obligation to register begins. The guidance appears to be
designed to apply to Bitcoin and similar virtual currencies,
although it is less clear whether it would apply to an in-game
currency like Linden Dollars or to a merchant-sponsored program
like Amazon Coins.
At least three exchanges that traded bitcoin shut down shortly
115
after the new guidance was issued. Patrick Murck, legal counsel
for the Bitcoin Foundation, which promotes use of the virtual
currency, said that rules “would be infeasible for many, if not most,
116
members of the bitcoin community to comply with.”
The spring 2013 actions by the federal government prompted
changes beyond bitcoin. For example, Linden Labs announced
that it was modifying terms of service for Second Life to prohibit
third-party currency exchanges and require all Linden Dollar
117
transactions to take place on its own exchange.
Treasury
Undersecretary David Cohen stated, however, that virtual currency
exchanges that comply with the law “have nothing to fear from
118
Treasury.”

113.
114.
115.

Id. at 2.
See supra text accompanying footnotes 76–81.
Jon Matonis, Fincen’s New Regulations Are Choking Bitcoin Entrepreneurs, AM.
BANKER (Apr. 25, 2013, 10:00 AM), http://www.americanbanker.com/bankthink
/fincen-regulations-choking-bitcoin-entrepreneurs-1058606-1.html.
116. Jeffrey Sparshott, Web Money Gets Laundering Rules, WALL ST. J., Mar. 22,
2013, at C1, available at LEXIS.
117. Linden Lab, Updated Second Life Terms of Service, SECOND LIFE (May 7,
2013, 11:55 AM), http://community.secondlife.com/t5/Featured-News/Updated
-Second-Life-Terms-of-Service/ba-p/1996185.
118. U.S.: Liberty Reserve Case No Comment on E-Currency Exchangers, UNITED
PRESS INT’L (May 29, 2013), available at LEXIS.
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V. ADDITIONAL FEDERAL AND STATE REGULATORS TAKE AN
INTEREST IN VIRTUAL CURRENCIES
Perhaps inspired by FinCEN’s issuance of guidance, in 2013
Congress and other federal agencies, along with some state
regulators, began to show an interest in Bitcoin and virtual
currencies.
At the federal level, there was a suggestion that the Commodity
Futures Trading Corporation should consider regulating virtual
119
currencies as a form of commodity trading. The Government
Accountability Office prepared a report for the Senate Committee
on Finance, which concluded that transactions “using virtual
currencies could produce taxable income in various ways” and
recommended that the IRS issue guidance to tax payers of the “tax
120
consequences of virtual economy transactions.” In August 2013,
the Senate Homeland Security Committee sent letters to several
federal agencies asking them to disclose their policies with regard
to virtual currencies, explain how those policies were developed,
and describe any future actions the agencies plan to take in this
121
area. In addition, the House Committee on Appropriations noted
that “Bitcoins and other forms of peer-to-peer digital currency are a
potential means for criminal, terrorist, or other illegal
organizations and individuals to illegally launder and transfer
122
money.” The committee then directed the Federal Bureau of
Investigation to prepare a report “on the nature and scale of the
risk posed by such ersatz currency, both in financing illegal
123
enterprises and in undermining financial institutions.”
The Senate then moved into high gear in November 2013,
holding two separate hearings on virtual currencies. First, the
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee held a
hearing entitled “Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and
119. Tracey Alloway et al., U.S. Regulators Eye Bitcoin Supervision, FIN. TIMES
(London) (May 6, 2013), available at LEXIS.
120. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-516, VIRTUAL ECONOMIES AND
CURRENCIES: ADDITIONAL IRS GUIDANCE COULD REDUCE TAX COMPLIANCE RISKS 10,
15 (2013), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/660/654620.pdf.
121. Zachary Warmbrodt, Congress Starts Looking into Bitcoin, POLITICO.COM
(Aug. 13, 2013, 12:08 AM) http://www.politico.com/story/2013/08/congress
-starts-looking-into-bitcoin-95464.html.
122. H.R. REP. NO. 113-171, at 45 (2013).
123. Id.
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Promises of Virtual Currencies,” which featured witnesses from law
enforcement and industry addressing the risks and potential
124
rewards of virtual currencies. The Senate Banking Committee
followed with its own hearing entitled “The Present and Future
Impact of Virtual Currency,” which also featured the perspectives
125
of law enforcement, state regulators, industry, and academics.
The hearings were widely viewed as positive developments for
virtual currencies and were described by one reporter as
126
“lovefests.” Law enforcement officials went on record describing
Bitcoin as having a legitimate purpose and constituting a legal
127
means of exchange.
128
State officials are also looking at virtual currency providers.
Several states have written to virtual currency exchanges and other
businesses suggesting that if the companies do not come into
compliance with state money transmitter rules, they will be shut
129
down.
In New York, the Department of Financial Services
(NYDFS) opened an investigation into virtual currencies and
subpoenaed twenty-two companies providing Bitcoin-related
130
services as well as a number of venture capital firms that have

124. Beyond Silk Road: Potential Risks, Threats, and Promises of Virtual
Currencies: Hearing on S.D. 342 Before the S. Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Gov’t
Affairs, 113 Cong. (2013), http://www.hsgac.senate.gov/hearings/beyond-silk
-road-potential-risks-threats-and-promises-of-virtual-currencies.
125. The Present and Future Impact of Virtual Currency: Hearing Before
the Subcomm. on Nat’l Sec. & Int’l Trade & Fin. of the S. Comm. on Banking,
Housing, & Urban Affairs, 113 Cong. (2013), http://www.banking.senate.gov
/public/index.cfm?FuseAction=Hearings.LiveStream&Hearing_id=955322cc-d648
-4a00-a41f-c23be8ff4cad.
126. Timothy B. Lee, Here’s How Bitcoin Charmed Washington, WASH. POST.
(Nov. 21, 2013), 2013 WL 29385308.
127. Max Raskin, U.S. Agencies to Say Bitcoins Offer Legitimate Benefits,
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 18, 2013, 4:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news
/2013-11-18/u-s-agencies-to-say-bitcoins-offer-legitimate-benefits.html; Ryan Tracy,
Authorities See Worth of Bitcoin, WALL ST. J, Nov. 19, 2013, at C1, available at LEXIS.
128. Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, ‘Virtual’ Currencies Draw State Scrutiny,
WALL ST. J., June 1, 2013, at A1, available at LEXIS.
129. Robin Sidel & Andrew R. Johnson, States Put Heat on Bitcoin: Letters Warn
Exchanges to Follow Money-Transmission Laws or Be Closed Down, WALL ST. J., June 26,
2013, at C1, available at LEXIS.
130. Emily Spaven, New York State Financial Regulator Issues Subpoenas to 22
Bitcoin Companies, COINDESK (Aug. 12, 2013, 5:55 PM), http://www.coindesk.com
/new-york-state-financial-regulator-issues-subpoenas-to-bitcoin-companies.
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131

invested in Bitcoin businesses.
In a public statement, the
NYDFS said, “If virtual currencies remain a virtual Wild West for
narcotraffickers and other criminals, that would not only threaten
our country’s national security, but also the very existence of the
132
virtual currency industry as a legitimate business enterprise.”
NYDFS stated that based on its preliminary investigation, it was
concerned that virtual currency exchangers may be engaging
in money transmission (as defined under New York state law)
without posting collateral, undergoing periodic safety and sound133
ness examinations, and complying with applicable anti-money134
laundering laws. Some state actions underscore how little officials
understand cryptocurrency. For example, the California Department of Financial Institutions sent a cease and desist letter to the
Bitcoin Foundation, a nonprofit organization registered in Washington, D.C. with the mission of standardizing and promoting the
135
Bitcoin protocol.
The letter charged the foundation with
engaging in money transmission in the state without a license,
apparently in reaction to the group hosting a conference in the
136
state. In response to all of the activity at the state level, a group of
Bitcoin companies and advocates formed the Digital Asset Transfer
Authority, a self-regulatory body for the industry, tasked with
developing common risk management and compliance standards
137
for members.

131. Bailey Reutzel, What NY’s Bitcoin Crackdown Means for Emerging Payments
Companies, PAYMENTS SOURCE (Aug. 12, 2013, 3:13 PM), available at LEXIS.
132. Memorandum from Benjamin M. Lawsky, Superintendent of Fin. Servs.,
Notice of Inquiry on Virtual Currencies 1 (Aug. 12, 2013), http://www.dfs.ny.gov
/about/press2013/memo1308121.pdf.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 2.
135. Matonis, supra note 4.
136. Id.
137. Danny Bradbury, Bitcoin Industry Leaders Launch DATA, A Self-Regulatory
Body for Digital Currencies, COINDESK (July 30, 2013, 10:04 AM), http://www
.coindesk.com/bitcoin-industry-leaders-launch-data-a-self-regulatory-body.

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol40/iss2/11

22

Middlebrook and Hughes: Regulating Cryptocurrencies in the United States: Current Issues

2014]

REGULATING CRYPTOCURRENCIES

835

VI. THE GOVERNMENT ACTS—ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS AGAINST MT.
GOX AND LIBERTY RESERVE
A.

Homeland Security Seizes Funds Held by Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox

On May 14, 2013, the Department of Homeland Security
obtained a seizure warrant directed to Dwolla, an Iowa-based
Internet payments company, ordering the seizure and forfeiture of
138
an account belonging to Mutum Sigillum, L.L.C. According to
the federal agent’s affidavit filed with the warrant application,
Mutum Sigillum is the U.S.-based subsidiary of Mt. Gox, the world’s
139
largest Bitcoin exchange, which is based in Japan. The affidavit
stated that a confidential informant residing in Maryland
established an account at Dwolla that he used to fund an account at
140
Mt. Gox and to purchase bitcoins. In addition, the informant also
exchanged bitcoins for U.S. dollars, which were transmitted back to
141
The
him through Mutum Sigillum and Dwolla accounts.
application asserted these transactions demonstrate that Mutum
Sigillum is engaged in money transmission but has failed to register
142
with FinCEN as required by 31 U.S.C. § 5330. The affidavit did
not cite the FinCEN Guidance issued on March 18, 2013, but it is
apparent from the document that the federal agent relied upon it.
By failing to register as required by § 5330, the government
asserted that Mt. Gox is in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1960 and subject
143
to criminal penalties. In addition, the forfeiture of property
involved in a transaction in violation of § 1960 is authorized by 18
144
U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A). The affidavit noted that Mutum Sigillum
138. Seizure Warrant at 1, In re Seizure of the Contents of One
Dwolla Account, No. 13-1162-SKG (D. Md. May 14, 2013), available at http://
cdn.arstechnica.net/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-Gox-Dwolla-Warrant-5-14
-13.pdf; see also Joe Mullin, Feds Seize Money from Dwolla Account Belonging to Top
Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox, ARS TECHNICA (May 14, 2013, 5:55 PM),
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/05/feds-seize-money-from-top-bitcoin
-exchange-mt-gox.
139. Affidavit in Support of Seizure Warrant at 2, In re Seizure of the Contents of
One Dwolla Account, No. 13-1162-SKG, available at http: //cdn.arstechnica.net/wp
-content/uploads/2013/05/Mt-Gox-Dwolla-Warrant-5-14-13.pdf.
140. Id. at 3.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 1.
144. Id. at 4–5.
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funds were also transmitted through an account at Wells Fargo and
145
that a separate warrant was issued to seize funds in that account.
Although law enforcement executed warrants to seize the funds of
Mt. Gox located in the United States, as of December 31, 2013, no
indictments of Mt. Gox or its subsidiary Mutum Sigillum have been
handed down. Perhaps in an effort to prevent criminal charges
from being brought against it, Mt. Gox implemented a new policy
requiring identity verification before it would perform currency
146
deposits or withdrawals. According to press reports, a total of five
147
million dollars was seized from Mt. Gox accounts.
B.

Department of Justice Indicts Liberty Reserve for Money Laundering

On May 28, 2013, the U.S. Attorney for the Southern District
of New York unsealed a criminal indictment charging Liberty
Reserve and seven of its principals and employees with operating
an unlicensed money transmitter and engaging in money
148
The indictment charges the defendants under
laundering.
18 U.S.C. § 1960 with conspiracy to operate and operating an
unlicensed money transmitting business in violation of 31 U.S.C.
149
§ 5330 and its accompanying regulations. Defendants were also
charged with conspiracy to commit money laundering in violation
145. Id. at 4; see also Brian Browdie, Bitcoin Exchange in U.S. Crosshairs Banked at
Wells Fargo, AM. BANKER (May 16, 2013), 2013 WL 12019270 (noting that their
Wells Fargo account had been seized).
146. Press Release, Mt. Gox Co., Statement Regarding Account Verifications
(May 30, 2013), https://mtgox.com/press_release_20130530.html. For more
information about these new procedures see Andy Greenberg, Not So
Anonymous: Bitcoin Exchange Mt. Gox Tightens Identity Requirements, FORBES (May 30,
2013, 12:03 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/05/30/not
-so-anonymous-bitcoin-exchange-mt-gox-tightens-identity-requirement.
147. Greg Schvey, Additional $2.1M Seized from Mt. Gox Accounts—Now Over
$5M Total, GENESIS BLOCK (Aug. 22, 2013), http://thegenesisblock.com/warrant
-for-mt-gox-wells-fargo-accounts-shows-additional-2-1m-seized.
148. Press Release, U.S. Attorney’s Office, S.D.N.Y., Manhattan U.S. Attorney
Announces Charges Against Liberty Reserve, One of World’s Largest Digital
Currency Companies, and Seven of Its Principals and Employees for Allegedly
Running a $6 Billion Money Laundering Scheme (May 28, 2013),
http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13/LibertyReservePR.php.
149. Indictment ¶¶ 33–42, United States v. Liberty Reserve, No.
13-CR-368 (S.D.N.Y. May 20, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao
/nys/pressreleases/May13/LibertyReservePR/Liberty%20Reserve,%20et%20al.
%20Indictment%20-%20Redacted.pdf.
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of 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a)(1)(B)(i) and 1956(a)(2)(B)(i). Liberty
Reserve is alleged to have been a “financial hub of the cyber-crime
world” facilitating identity theft, credit card fraud, computer
151
hacking, child pornography, and drug trafficking. It had 200,000
users in the United States and processed over twelve million
152
transactions a year with a value of more than $1.4 billion.
Criminals were drawn to Liberty Reserve because it did not require
users to validate their identity with the service and criminals could
153
create accounts under false names such as “Russian Hackers.”
The government alleges that Liberty Reserve, in an effort to add an
additional layer of anonymity, did not permit users to transmit
funds directly to Liberty Reserve but instead required them to
154
make deposits and withdrawals through third-party exchanges.
These exchangers were themselves unlicensed money transmitters
operating without government oversight from Malaysia, Russia,
155
Nigeria, and Vietnam.
Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1), the government sought
forfeiture of “at least $6 billion” held in accounts in Costa Rica,
Cyprus, Russia, Hong Kong, China, Morocco, Spain, Latvia,
Australia, and one account at SunTrust Bank in the United
156
States. In a declaration filed in support of the indictment, a
Secret Service agent stated that the investigation included
execution of “one of the first-ever ‘cloud’-based search warrants,
directed to a service provider used to process Liberty Reserve’s
157
Internet traffic.” The government also sought an injunction
preventing Amazon Web Services from providing services to
158
support Liberty Reserve’s web site.

150. Id. ¶¶ 30–32.
151. Id. ¶ 9.
152. Id. ¶ 10.
153. Id. ¶¶ 14, 19.
154. Id. ¶ 16.
155. Id. ¶ 18.
156. Id. ¶ 43.
157. Declaration of Special Agent [] in Support of Ex Parte Application
for Post-Indictment Restraining Order, Seizure Warrant and Injunction
Exhibit B, ¶ 9, United States v. Liberty Reserve, No. 13-CR-368 (S.D.N.Y.
May 23, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/usao/nys/pressreleases/May13
/LibertyReservePR/Liberty%20Reserve,%20et%20al.%20Redacted%20AUSA%20
Appln%20with%20exhibits.pdf.
158. Id. ¶ 74.
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On the same day that indictment was unsealed, FinCEN issued
a notice of proposed rulemaking to declare Liberty Reserve an
institution of primary money laundering concern under section
159
311 of the Patriot Act. The designation would prohibit U.S.
financial institutions from maintaining correspondent relationships
160
with foreign banks that do business with Liberty Reserve. The
measure “would effectively cut off Liberty Reserve from the U.S.
161
financial system.”
Although the Mt. Gox forfeiture order and the e-gold
and Liberty Reserve criminal indictments are quite different on
a number of levels, all three enforce regulatory business requirements through a criminal process and rely on the often-criticized
162
penalty of asset forfeiture.
While this may be a convenient and effective way for law
enforcement to deal with money launderers, it has significant
collateral effect on small companies and start-ups who wish to
operate within the confines of the law but lack the resources or the
expertise to navigate such tricky regulatory waters. Establishing
appropriate compliance obligations without stifling innovation in
emerging payments technology is always a concern. With regard to
virtual currencies, it remains to be seen whether the government
163
has found the proper balance.
VII. FUTURE PARADIGMS FOR THE REGULATION OF CRYPTOCURRENCY
Cryptocurrencies face efforts to regulate their existence and
the manner in which they are transferred and redeemed by both
state and federal authorities in the United States as well as by
164
foreign governments.
In order for future regulation to be
159. Imposition of Special Measure Against Liberty Reserve S.A. as a Financial
Institution of Primary Money Laundering Concern, 78 Fed. Reg. 34,008 (proposed
June 6, 2013) (to be codified at 31 C.F.R. pt. 1010).
160. Id. at 30,009–10.
161. Chris Cumming, Fincen Seeks to Deputize Banks in $6B Laundering Case, AM.
BANKER (May 29, 2013), 2013 WLNR 13105120.
162. See, e.g., Sarah Stillman, Taken, NEW YORKER, Aug. 12, 2013, at 48, available
at 2013 WLNR 20611866.
163. For a discussion of the potential “chilling effect” of California’s money
transmitter statute, see Bryans, supra note 6 (manuscript at 34–35).
164. See Deepak Tiwari, Bitcoin Dealers Realize a Regulated Market Is Better for
Growth and Development, FOREXMINUTE (Sept. 8, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www
.forexminute.com/bitcoin/bitcoin-dealers-realize-a-regulated-market-is-better-for
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successful and foster a new monetary technology that appropriately
weighs both the needs of citizens and governments, a number of
paradigmatic questions will require answers. In this part of the
article, we raise those questions that have occurred to us that we
feel deserve serious thought and exploration by industry
participants, regulators, and legislators. We also take the liberty of
suggesting for some of these questions the direction in which we
think the analysis should advance. We make no claim, however, to
have thought of all of the possible questions or to have answers to
the majority of them. We offer these thoughts in the spirit of
fostering a robust debate on the future of cryptocurrencies.
What Is Cryptocurrency?
Proponents can’t easily explain what a cryptocurrency is. If you
can’t explain what you are and how you fit into the current legal
and regulatory scheme, you are at the mercy of the ignorant. The
“what this is” answer needs to address not just things like “is it
money transmission?” but more mundane yet important questions
like “where is a bitcoin located?” and “where and when does a
transaction take place?”
Cryptocurrency supporters should address whether cryptocurrency is a currency/store of value or a payment system or a
hybrid of both. They should also be prepared to explain if and
when these products should be treated like securities or
commodities or prepaid access.
It is also important for proponents to separate the different
“brands” of cryptocurrency (Bitcoin, Litecoin, Ripple, etc.) from
each other and the larger concept of a cryptographically-secured
value transfer system. Given that the different protocols will likely
develop along divergent pathways, some choosing to emphasize
certain attributes (like anonymity), the industry is going to have to
decide how it wishes to treat players who take a minority position. It
may be that certain protocols will evolve to support different
business models, introducing changes so significant that the

-growth-and-development-14540 (reporting on a meeting between U.K. policy
makers and Bitcoin dealers that recently took place at Downing Street at which the
participants concluded that the U.K. government should introduce regulation for
bitcoins).
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modified product should be treated as a different species subject to
a different regulatory scheme.
What Is the Proper Regulatory Scheme for Cryptocurrency?







Among the most probable possibilities are:
None. Cryptocurrency will not be regulated. We think this
option has no chance of being adopted.
Unique cryptocurrency regulatory scheme. While this could be
the ideal solution, this currently seems an unlikely outcome.
The law has a tendency to address new products and
technologies by analogizing to existing regulatory schemes.
We suggest that this outcome is not wholly impossible,
however, and note that with its e-money directive, the
European Union demonstrated that if legislators are willing to
make hard policy choices, they can craft a regulatory scheme
165
uniquely tailored to a new technology.
Cryptocurrency as money transmission. This seems to be the
current direction based on recent actions by FinCEN and the
states. It is unclear that this route is optimal, but for those
entities that can comply with federal and state money
transmitter requirements, this option provides a safe haven.
One example of a payments innovator that used this option to
enormous benefit is PayPal.
Cryptocurrency as bank product. Banks are currently standing
on the sidelines as other entities develop and market
cryptocurrency. This might change, however, especially if the
innovators are successful in navigating the regulatory waters
and at turning a profit. We believe that in the future, banks
may become involved in the cryptocurrency market, which
would have interesting regulatory implications. Banks are
exempt from state money transmitter laws and registration
requirements. Banks, however, have come under heavy
pressure to police their business partners that offer innovative
166
Given recent communications that banks and
products.
other depository institutions have received about facilitating
providers of certain consumer payments, banks may well take a

165.
166.

Council Directive 2009/110/EC, 2009 O.J. (L267) 7, 7 (EC).
See Memorandum from Benjamin M. Lawsky, supra note 132.
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“wait-and-see” attitude before deciding how or how much to
participate in or with cryptocurrencies. If cryptocurrency
establishes itself more firmly in the future, then banks are
likely to become players by buying participants. This was the
strategy that several banks used with prepaid cards.
Cryptocurrency as multiple activities. We could see
cryptocurrency regulation varying significantly based on the
role taken by participants. Administrators and exchanges, for
example, might be subjected to the full panoply of state and
federal money transmitter rules, while an individual merely
using a cryptocurrency to make a purchase would remain
167
unregulated.
One can see the beginnings of such an
approach in the FinCEN Guidance.

Are Cryptocurrencies Intended to Provide Anonymous Transactions?
A business model that is predicated on providing anonymity is
going to face a very high level of scrutiny. Entities that provide
payment services designed to provide anonymity are going to find
themselves cut off from the rest of the financial system, making it
difficult if not impossible for users to engage the service. Federal
regulators have already used section 311 of the Patriot Act to isolate
168
and effectively close Liberty Reserve. It’s important to understand
that anonymity is not binary, meaning that the choice isn’t between
absolute anonymity and completely open transactions. The
questions are (1) what degree of anonymity is provided, (2) what is
the process for breaking anonymity, and (3) who controls the
process. An important question will be whether current law that
prevents financial institutions from providing customer records to
federal agencies except in certain limited circumstances will be
extended to cover newer technology like cryptocurrency that is not
169
offered by a traditional financial institution.
167. For discussion of this “regulation-in-part” concept, as well as one view of
the optimal manner of regulating exchanges, see Bryans, supra note 6 (manuscript
at 34–35).
168. See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
169. See provisions prohibiting government access to financial records
included in the Right to Financial Privacy Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3401−3422 (2012). For
an analysis of the application of the Right to Financial Privacy Act to prepaid
cards, see Stephen T. Middlebrook, What’s in Your Wallet? Could It Be the Department
of Homeland Security?, BUS. L. TODAY, Nov. 2013, at 1.
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One solution, already used in the prepaid industry, is to allow
anonymous users and transactions with certain lower velocity limits
and to require customer identification when dollar volumes (or
rather, coin volumes) exceed a certain threshold.
It is also important to note that anonymity is incongruous with
consumer protections.
Will Future Regulation Be Driven by Payments Policy Concerns or Law
Enforcement Demands?
The 2013 FinCEN Guidance came out after the Mt. Gox and
Liberty Reserve investigations were underway, but before public law
enforcement actions were taken. It’s tempting to ask whether
FinCEN was pressured by law enforcement to issue the
guidance and whether FinCEN’s analysis was influenced by law
enforcement’s immediate needs. We have no answers to these
questions.
Assuming Anonymity Is Resolved, What Is the Appropriate Level of
Consumer Protection for Cryptocurrency Users?
It appears that users of e-gold, Liberty Reserve, and perhaps
Mt. Gox have lost funds entrusted with those providers. What
recourse should users, and particularly consumers, have in such
situations? The current state of regulatory uncertainty imperils not
just cryptocurrency businesses and their investors, but also their
users. Although the finality of transactions that cannot be disputed
170
or reversed may appeal to sellers on the Silk Road, ordinary, lawabiding individuals eventually will expect the same kinds of
protections from unauthorized or fraudulent transactions they
receive on credit and debit cards.
To demonstrate the prospective dollar value of transactions
that might arise on Bitcoin or another cryptocurrency that ordinary

170. For a useful discussion on finality of payments, see Katy Jacob & Kristin E.
Wells, Evaluating the Potential for Immediate Funds Transfer for General-Purpose
Payments in the United States, CHI. FED. LETTER (Fed. Reserve Bank, Chi., Ill.) Nov.
2011, available at http://www.chicagofed.org/digital_assets/publications/chicago
_fed_letter/2011/cflnovember2011_292a.pdf (identifying “immediate funds
transfer” (IFT) as bank-to-bank transfers “with no or minimal delay in receiver’s
receipt and use of funds” and citing the growing availability of IFT abroad). For
discussion of the use of bitcoins in Silk Road transactions, see Ball, supra note 23.
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individuals would care about, we cite the fact that bitcoins are
touted as a cost-effective alternative for individuals wanting to make
171
remittance payments to their home countries. Should (does?) the
172
apply to cryptocurrency
federal Remittance Transfer Rule
transactions?
Which Government Will Have Jurisdiction over Cryptocurrencies for
Purposes Such as Escheat?
Assuming that the “location” of a bitcoin is resolved, regulators
will have to address abandoned property issues. This might strike
readers as a silly concern, but there are billions of dollars at stake
and states will fight to escheat abandoned bitcoins or other
173
cryptocurrencies or virtual currencies.
Looking at other regulatory paradigms might help us predict
how federal, state, and foreign governments might regulate
cryptocurrencies. In particular, reviewing past regulatory
approaches for the following products might prove instructive:
174
 online gaming;
171. Joshua Brustein, Will Migrant Workers Drive Bitcoin’s Mundane Future?,
BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 8, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-1008/will-migrant-workers-drive-bitcoins-mundane-future.
172. 12 C.F.R. pt. 1005 (2012).
173. For decisions involving the escheat of funds in gift cards, see N.J. Retail
Merchs. Ass’n v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 374, 396–98 (3d Cir. 2012) (affirming
the district court’s injunction against a “place of purchase” presumption for its
jurisdictional claim to escheat priority); Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co. v.
Sidamon-Eristoff, 755 F. Supp. 2d 556, 563 (D.N.J. 2010). For discussions of these
decisions, see Sarah Jane Hughes, L’Embarras du Choix: A Year of Developments in the
Laws Affecting Remittance Transfers, Credit Cards, and Certain Prepaid Cards, 68 BUS.
LAW. 233, 234, 241–42 (2012); Sarah Jane Hughes & Stephen T. Middlebrook,
Developments in the Laws Governing Electronic Payments Made Through Gift Cards, Debit
and Prepaid Cards, Credit Cards, and Direct Deposits of Federal Benefits, 66 BUS. LAW.
159, 159 (2010). For an extensive analysis of state escheat laws and their
application to e-payments, see Anita Ramasastry, State Escheat Statutes and Possible
Treatment of Stored Value, Electronic Currency, and Other New Payment Mechanisms,
57 BUS. LAW. 475, 475 (2001).
174. In particular, we note that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement
Act of 2006, 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361–5367, defines a “financial transaction provider” as
a creditor, credit card issuer, financial institution, operator of a
terminal at which an electronic fund transfer may be initiated, money
transmitting business, or international, national, regional, or local
payment network utilized to effect a credit transaction, electronic fund
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electronic financial services that can be provided only by banks
because they involve “deposits” that are subject to core
banking regulations;
 electronic financial services not provided by banks and that
state and federal regulators would deem to be “money
175
transmission” under their respective statutes;
 electronic financial services that do not qualify as money
transmissions or as “deposits” under the definition in the
176
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Act; and
 forms of fractional-value “notes”—often called “shinplasters”—
subject to the Stamp Payments Act of 1862 and thus,
177
prohibited in the United States.
Other reasons why governments—national governments and,
in the United States, state governments—regulate media of
exchange relate to ancient concerns that apply just as much to
cryptocurrencies as they did to the earlier 1990s styles of “virtual
178
currencies.” These concerns include widely found protections
such as (1) safe storage of value; (2) redemption on predictable
terms without interruptions such as those experienced by users of
the Mt. Gox Bitcoin exchange in 2013; (3) protections against
counterfeits or re-use or replications of the same unique “tokens”
transfer, stored value product transaction, or money transmitting
service, or a participant in such network, or other participant in a
designated payment system.
Id. § 5362(4). The gist of the Act is to make payments processing illegal if the law
of the state in which the gambling occurred makes the wager or bet illegal. Id.
§ 5363.
175. See supra text accompanying notes 74–86.
176. See 12 U.S.C. § 1813(l) (2012).
177. See 18 U.S.C. § 336 (2006). The constitutionality of the Stamp Payments
Act (which only applies to values under one dollar) and of the National Currency
Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665 (authorizing issuance of “greenbacks” not
backed by specie), replaced by National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), were tested in a series of
United States Supreme Court decisions beginning shortly after the Civil War
ended, including United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1877) (reviewing claim of
violation of the Stamp Payments Act, but holding act was not violated because the
scrip was explicitly only redeemable in goods, and was not intended to circulate as
money).
178. For a discussion of early e-payments products, see Sarah Jane Hughes,
A Call for International Legal Standards for Emerging Retail Electronic Payment Systems,
15 ANN. REV. BANKING L. 197, 206–15 (1996) (describing products offered by First
Virtual Holdings, Inc., DigiCash BV, and Mondex, among others).
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that coins, paper currency, and even “electronic instruments”
should have; and (4) seigniorage. Depending on the nature of the
transaction, the federal government and the states have had widely
varying regulations governing error resolution, including on the
reversibility of payments, for users of credit and debit cards, payroll
cards, checks, and even funds transfers.
VIII. CONCLUSION
No cryptocurrency issuer, exchanger, or user should have
expected that the government of the United States—or any other
government for that matter—would allow any significant storage of
value in its “currency” without deciding to regulate the issuer or
central exchange involved in some manner.
Why? Because that is what governments have been doing to
protect both trade and their own seigniorage rights for at least the
past 500 years. By 1605, for example, the English courts were
already convinced of the Crown’s right to control what constituted
179
“legal tender” and who could issue “legal tender.” The federal
government’s exclusive right to issue “coins” is expressed in the
180
U.S. Constitution. When Congress enacted the Stamp Payments
181
182
Act of 1862, the National Currency Act of 1863, and then the
183
National Bank Act of 1864, it expressed its conviction that it
alone had authority to declare what qualifies as “legal tender.”

179. See The Case of Mixed Money, [1605] 80 Eng. Rep. 507 (P.C.)
(upholding the right of Elizabeth I of England to devalue the currency, as she had
in 1601, even if it caused great suffering among the people of Ireland), translated
in JOHN DAVIES, A REPORT OF CASES AND MATTERS IN LAW: RESOLVED AND ADJUDGED
IN THE KING’S COURTS IN IRELAND [1604–1612], at 48 (1762). A key sentence from
the opinion in that case proclaimed: “That it appertaineth only to the [K]ing of
England, to make or coin money within his dominions; [King’s prerogative in
making or coining money.]” Id. at 51. The court also announced its conviction
that there were three attributes of “money” and “legal tender” that distinguished
them: the prince, the stamp, and the value. Id. at 52.
180. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 5 (“To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof,
and of foreign Coin . . . .”).
181. Stamp Payments Act of 1862, ch. 196, § 2, 12 Stat. 592 (codified at 18
U.S.C. § 336 (2012)).
182. National Currency Act of 1863, ch. 58, § 1, 12 Stat. 665, replaced by
National Bank Act of 1864, ch. 106, 13 Stat. 99 (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C.).
183. National Bank Act, § 1, 13 Stat. 99.
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The Supreme Court agreed with Congress in a series of famous
decisions beginning shortly after the National Bank Act was
184
185
enacted. In Veazie Bank v. Fenno, the Supreme Court upheld
Congress’s imposition of a tax of ten percent imposed on state and
national banks paying out “notes” of individuals or state banks used
for circulation, likening this tax to the payment of duties. The
Court specifically recited a number of facts about the manner in
which Congress has taken charge of legal tender, including
(1) denying the quality of legal tender to foreign coins,
(2) providing a law against counterfeits and base coin on the
community, (3) restraining the issue of notes not issued under its
own authority, and (4) observing that without the power to control
these aspects of legal tender, Congress’s “attempts to secure a
186
sound and uniform currency for the country must be futile.”
The Supreme Court was even more forceful in holding the
1860s “legal tender” acts constitutional, both as to contracts
187
entered into before and after their passage. The Court’s opinion
discussed the powers of the sovereign and noted that the Court
would have to reverse course for its growing body of canons of

184. See United States v. Van Auken, 96 U.S. 366 (1877) (reviewing claim of
violation of the Stamp Payments Act (which only prohibits issuance of notes with
values under one dollar), but holding that the act was not violated because the
scrip was explicitly only redeemable in goods and was not intended to circulate as
money); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. 457, 549–55 (1870), abrogated by Tahoe-Sierra
Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002)
(upholding the constitutionality of the legal tender acts as to contracts entered
into both after and before their enactment, with much interesting discussion of
the powers of the sovereign over currency and coinage, and holding the National
Currency Act of February 25, 1863 to be valid to pay most government
obligations).
185. Veazie Bank v. Fenno, 75 U.S. 533 (1869).
186. Id. at 549 (describing the federal government’s rights under the
Constitution, the claim of direct but non-apportioned taxation, and the ninth
section of the Act of July 13, 1866 that imposed a ten percent tax on notes issued
by banking associations chartered by the states). For additional discussion of that
decision, see Nikolei M. Kaplanov, Nerdy Money: Bitcoin, the Private Digital Currency,
and the Case Against Its Regulation, 25 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 111 (2012).
187. Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. at 549–55 (holding that “greenbacks” issued
under the authority of the National Currency Act of February 25, 1863 were valid
to pay most government obligations).
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statutory construction if it did not uphold Congress’s acts
188
concerning legal tender.
A government’s interests are no less when one considers the
189
authority to tax transactions and profits and to impose duties
190
on foreign transactions. Thus, following its announcement that
it would not require Bitcoin exchanges to register as a “money
service” or “money transmitter” in the United Kingdom, Her
Majesty’s representatives still warned Bitcoin users about paying
191
attention to the tax implications of their Bitcoin transactions.
Those representatives, however, predicted that regulation “will
definitely come into play” and “so it is in the best interests of
businesses that think they are transacting as a money services
business to still keep anti-money laundering and know-yourcustomer practices in play so they’re prepared for when
192
HMRC does come knocking.” Soon afterwards, Her Majesty’s
representatives did an about-face and, following a meeting with
Bitcoin U.K. representatives, announced their intention to issue
193
regulations.
Considering the different possible regulatory paradigms and
the questions we raised in Part VII of this article, we find ample
evidence of governments’ interests in regulating cryptocurrencies
in one fashion or another and of several possible ways to determine
which of the competing federal-versus-state and payments-versussecurities-versus-commodities paradigms should be considered.
Even among the paradigms that apply to different payments
systems, options abound. The participants in transactions of this
type have long had regulations governing their rights and have

188. Id. at 491–96.
189. For an interesting discussion of the authority to tax and the reasons for
exercising that authority, see Omri Marian, Are Cryptocurrencies Super Tax Havens?,
112 MICH. L. REV. FIRST IMPRESSIONS 38 (2013).
190. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
191. See Emily Spaven, HMRC: UK Bitcoin Exchanges Don’t Have to Register
Under Money Laundering Regulations, COINDESK (July 8, 2013, 2:39 PM),
http://www.coindesk.com/hmrc-uk-bitcoin-exchanges-dont-have-to-registerunder-money-laundering-regulations/ (explaining that although there is “no
specific regulation relating to digital currency” in the U.K., “standard tax rules
apply” and, thus, “those who receive bitcoin in return for goods and services will
have to pay tax on any profits they make”).
192. Id.
193. Tiwari, supra note 164.
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had, in greater and lesser degrees, government regulation of
depositories and exchange/payment systems rules. Some of these
regulations grew out of informal self-regulation, at least as the
subjects suitable for resolution by private law or system rules—as
opposed to public law—are concerned.
The federal government’s action against e-gold and its 2013
regulatory guidance and law enforcement actions against Liberty
Reserve and Mt. Gox persuade us that the government will exercise
regulatory authority over cryptocurrencies and other virtual
currencies to some extent.
Despite the tendency of new Internet-based entrants to
imagine themselves to be entitled to exist and operate without
regulations, a kind of unregulated Wild West attitude, the oldfashioned notions of why we regulate payments and value-storage
media that we discuss in this article suggest to us that regulation
will happen, and that its challenges will be similar to those faced
since kings and princes first issued coins and then issued other
indicia of stored value such as paper “money” that qualified for use
as “legal tender.”
The idea that governments issue “money” and declare what
qualifies as “legal tender” is an ancient notion. The history of
regulating money and legal tender suggests that it is not likely that
governments will surrender their privileges to regulate
cryptocurrency issuers, exchanges, administrators, or users. The
real questions are which paradigm(s) governments will use, how
much enforcement energy they will spend on regulating
cryptocurrencies, and whether and how they will compete with
each other to offer regulatory schemes that do not send
cryptocurrency entrepreneurs, investors, and users running
offshore.
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